This article takes the case of Thailand to present the distribution of income and the evolution of the profit rate in a low-wage country which belongs to the second generation of newly industrialising countries. We show that during the boom years the high rate of profit was not based on a continuous process of modernisation but rather on a redistribution of income in favour of capital. We also analyse the link between the distribution of income and competitiveness. We show that labour income repression is not necessary to maintain competitiveness. Quite to the contrary, in this period of international crisis the labour income share should recover lost ground if Thailand and other Asian countries want to rebalance growth in favour of domestic demand.
Introduction
This article analyses the long term distribution of income of the Thai economy from the period 1960 to 2007. To our knowledge, it is the first analysis of this kind on such a long time span. During this period of long-term growth, the "Asian crisis" of 1997-1999 marks a watershed moment between a rather high and stable growth era and a slow growth era which ends with the international crisis which affected Asia at the end of 2008. In section 1, we show that from 1960 to 1996, the labour share of the national income of the entire economy has lost about 25%. In manufacturing, labour increased its share by about 15%, but because wage employment in manufacturing never exceeded 12% of total employment on the whole period, it was not enough to counterbalance the overall declining trend. After the crisis of 1997-1999, however, the labour income share in both sectors has declined, especially in manufacturing where it almost returned to its 1980 level. This, we argue, signals a change in the growth regime. Except for limited periods of time, Thai workers have never fully benefited from increases in labour productivity. On the contrary, labour productivity gains and progress in the income share of capital have contributed toward achieving a high profit rate in the Thai economy as a whole, and especially in manufacturing. We then turn to the analysis of the impact of the distribution of income on competitiveness and growth (section 2). We show that during the booming years (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , a combination of rising unit labour cost and a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar contributed to a decrease in price competitiveness and an important deficit of the trade balance. In this respect, the crisis of the years 1997-1999 was unavoidable. Since 2005, this loss of competitiveness can be attributed to the appreciation of the Baht combined with a slow growth in labour productivity. In this new environment, firms are tempted to repress wages to restore their competitiveness because it is far easier than improving productivity in a context of low investment rate. Other things being equal, we show that to offset the sharp appreciation of the exchange rate, the labour share would have to fall to an unprecendented low level of 52.6% of GDP. This obviously would run contrary to the necessity to rebalance growth by revamping households' consumption.
This conclusion is not only pertinent for the Thai case. Other Asian countries have been confronted recently to a strong appreciation of their currencies combined with a slow growth and a low investment rate. With the international crisis which started in Asia in 2008 they are also faced with the necessity to rebalance their growth in favour of internal demand. This can be only be achieved if households' income regain the loss suffered these last decades and this can be done without a major impact on competitiveness.
Section 1: The distribution of income in Thailand. Who benefited from growth?
Thailand has achieved in 2007 a gross national income per capita of 7,440 US$ -approximately 70% above the average of the East Asia and Pacific region i . It was a poor country after the Second World War but is now part of the lower-middle income group of countries thanks to a combination of rapid growth, economic (if not political) stability, and a steadily reduction of absolute poverty incidence over several decades. National policymakers in Thailand pursued an import substitution policy from the fifties until 1977 when it officially shifted towards an export-promotion set of policies. From 1952 From to 1986 , the annual growth of GDP reached an average of 6.9%. The real take-off occurred during the boom period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , with a real annual growth rate of 9.5%, which was at the time the fastest growth rate in the world. From 1952 to 1996, Thailand never suffered a single year of recession. The impact of the East Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1999, however, had massively damaging effects on the Thai economy. The economy has never fully recovered from this blow. Since the crisis, real GDP grew at only 5.1% on annual average during the post crisis years of 2000 to 2007, and further indications since then indicate that the Thai economy has now entered a slow growth era ii As a consequence of the dramatic transformations in the Thai economy since the 1960s, Thailand has experienced a tremendous change in the composition of its employment with the rise of wage workers and the fall of non-wage workers (see figure 1).
.
Figure 1 here
Non-wage workers are composed of family helpers and own-account workers. Family helpers, who work mainly in agriculture, used to be the most numerous workers in Thailand. They were usually unpaid and were working on the family farm or in small family shops. In 1969, they accounted for 53% of employment. Their share fell dramatically in the subsequent decades as they left the countryside and migrated to cities, mostly Bangkok, to find salaried and better paying jobs in the industrial and service sectors. Family helpers now represent merely around 20% of employment. This share will probably keep on decreasing in the coming years but at a much slower pace. For this reason, Thailand can no longer be considered a country with an abundant labour pool. The share of own-account workers remained almost stable around 31% during the whole period. This category includes farmers who own their land, shop owners, small and medium enterprises and various kinds of professionals. One reason for this stability is a strong aspiration among Thais, especially blue collar workers, to create a small business and become their own boss, and for some to return to the family farm. Together, family helpers and own-account workers accounted for about one half of total employment in 2007 down from 86% in 1969 (see figure1). They also form the bulk of the informal economy (iii 
The income distribution at the level of the total economy

)
. The other half is essentially constituted of wage earners (in state and private companies) and employers. Wage earners in private companies represented a small minority of workers in the late sixties with 9% of total employment. They now account for 36.5% in 2007. Government employees doubled their share of national income from 4% in the sixties to 8% in the years 2000. Together, private and government employees now represent 44.5% of employment up from 14% almost forty years before. This dramatic change means that wage labour, which is the backbone of capitalism, will be the driving force of the Thai economy in the near future. But because it is still a minor share of employment, own-account workers' and family helpers' share of labour income must be taken into account to get a comprehensive view of the distribution of income in Thailand.
We base our analysis on the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of Thailand. Wage earners' income is registered as "compensation of employees" while own-account workers' income (such as farmers, shop retailers, barbers, doctors, lawyers, etc.) is registered as the "Operating Surplus of Unincorporated Enterprises" (OSPUE). Family helpers live with own-account workers and receive an income in kind or small amount of money from own-account workers, usually the head of the family. This means that OSPUE is shared between own-account workers and family helpers. In 1960, OSPUE amounted to 72% of national income while the compensation of employees amounted to 22% only. In 2007, OSPUE had decreased dramatically to 35% while the compensation of employees was up to 37%. The decline in OSPUE share is explained by a decline in the income of both farmers and other own-account workers. In 2007, farmers' income amounted to a mere 9% of national income and the income of other own-account workers to 26%. As a form of labour income, this income is in fact overestimated because it cannot be attributed to labour income only. In reality, it is a mix of wages and profits because own-account workers do not manage the accounts of production factors separately.
In order to reduce the bias introduced by the presence of profit in OSPUE, the methodology proposed by D. Gollin, (Gollin, 2002 ) is applied (iv) . We prefer Gollin's approach because other alternatives are not suitable in the case of Thailand. For instance attributing the average compensation of employees to non-wage workers grossly overestimates their income because farmers' income is usually much lower . The result following Gollin's method is the adjusted labour share presented in figure  2 . 1996 is the last year before the crisis broke and can be considered as a benchmark.
One can see that the labour share has experienced an historical downward trend. It fell from about 86% in 1960 to a trough of 62% in 1996, then recovered during the crisis years because of the fall of profit, but declined again during the period of recovery to 65% in 2007 (see figure 2 ). Until 1996, these movements are explained by the sharp decline of all categories of own-account workers' income share while wage earners' share was progressing but at a slower pace. Since the crisis, these trends have reversed. In 2007, wage earners' share has decreased to 37.4%, below its 1996 level of 38.7%, while own-account workers' share has stopped its long-term decline. This is due to a stabilisation of famers' income to around 10% of GDP and a recovery of other own-account workers' share to 26%, i.e. 4% above its 1996 level.
Because the national revenue is shared between labour and capital, the capital share mirrors the evolution of the labour share vi In effect, the profit rate can be written as:
. The capital share has remained below 20% in the sixties and the seventies during the import-substitution phase. But, after the adoption of the export-oriented strategy and the boom that followed (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , the capital share has more than doubled from a trough of 17% in 1980 to a maximum of 38% in 1996. Due to the crisis, it fell to 25% in 1999, still 5% above the pre-boom level, but quickly returned to 30% during the recovery period, benefiting again from the decline of wage earners' income share. The evolution of the capital income share is crucial because it determines the profit rate along with capital productivity.
( 1) where P is the volume of profit, K the stock of capital and Y the GDP at factor cost.
In other words, the profit rate is the product of the income capital share times the productivity of capital . The income capital share reflects the distribution of the national revenue while the productivity of capital reflects both the incorporation of technical progress and the intensity in the use of productive capacities. When investment adds new generations of capital and the economy is growing rapidly, technical progress is intense and there are no idle capacities of production. In this case, capital productivity is high and contributes positively to the profit rate. It can even compensate for a low capital share of income which in itself means that the distribution of national revenue is more favourable to labour. Figure 3 , which depicts the evolution of the profit rate and its two determinants, shows that this ideal case is rarely observed in the Thai economy.
Figure 3 here
One can see that during the import-substitution policy period (until 1978) , the profit rate improved and remained constant around 7% thanks to a strong increase in capital productivity while the capital share remained depressed below 20% of GDP. The adoption of the export-oriented policy after 1978 is followed by an inversion in the working of the determinants of the profit rate. The productivity of capital begins to decline from its historical peak (40% in 1978) while the capital share increases progressively. At first, this has no noticeable effect on the profit rate, which stays at the constant level of 7%. During the boom period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , the productivity of capital increased briefly until 1989, which saw the climax of growth, when huge investments were made incorporating technical progress, but then declined again at a faster pace until the trough of 1998 (22.9%). This decline was offset by a strong increase of the capital share from 21% in 1987 to almost 37% in 1996. As a consequence, the profit rate jumped from the pattern of 7% where it was until 1987 to 11% where it stayed until 1996. This means that the profit rate push was entirely dependent on the capacity to restrain the labour share of GDP and was not based on an increasing capital productivity reflecting an improvement of overall efficiency. In this sense, one can say that the over-accumulation of capital laid the ground for the crisis 1997-1999 which was not purely financial but was rooted into the productive sphere. Since 2000, the situation has changed once again dramatically. The crisis has eliminated most of excess capacities and capital productivity is on the rise for the first time since the first half on the seventies. The income capital share is also increasing and closing the gap with its pre-crisis level. As a consequence, the profit rate has recovered and reached 10.5% in 2007, close to its historical level (11%) realised in 1991 during the boom, although the rate of growth is almost half the boom level. Thai capitalism seems able to adapt and make profit in a new era of slower growth, like most brands of capitalism found in developed countries.
The income distribution in the manufacturing sector
The pattern of structural changes that typically accompany economic development gives a crucial role to manufacturing. Manufacturing is usually the driving force of growth because this is where technical and organisational innovations take place which generate the bulk of productivity gains . Thai industrialisation is a recent phenomenon which started in the sixties with the import substitution strategy but which really takes off when combined to an export-oriented strategy in the second-half of the eighties. Employment in manufacturing, the core of the industry, was initially very small and grew slowly. In 1970, there were 346 thousand wage workers representing 2% of total employment. In 2007, there were 4.5 million wage workers amounting to 12.2% of total employment. Contrary to what we have observed at the level of the total economy, the labour income share has increased from 1970 until 1996 but declined significantly after the 1997-1999 crisis (see figure  4 ). Starting at a very low level, 21.6% in 1970, the labour income share in the manufacturing GDP increased at a low pace reaching 32% in 1986. It increased at a much higher pace during the boom period and reached 45% in 1996. The crisis inverted the trend and in 2007, the labour share had returned to 33%, close to its 1980s level. How can we explain this evolution? Two combined factors are involved: Labour shortage and labour conflicts.
The strong labour demand by manufacturing firms led to a general shortage of labour during the boom period. Baker and Phongpaichit (1998, pp 134-135) have shown that the flow of workers to Bangkok "grew to a stream and not to a flow" and how by 1988-89 firms had to move outside of Bangkok to be able to recruit enough workers. The scarcity of labour was especially severe for skilled workers but unskilled and semi-skilled labour was also implicated as well. In response, firms brought legal or non-legal migrant workers from neighbouring countries in the region to work in the most labour-intensive and low-wage industries. This created a segmented labour market with skilled workers at the core, a second tier of semi-skilled or unskilled Thai workers and a third tier of migrant workers. The entry in a new slow-growth regime after the crisis has deepened the segmentation of the labour market. There is still a labour shortage of skilled workers who can bargain their way from one firm to another until one firm pays the price to retain them. But for the majority of non-skilled and semi-skilled workers, the situation is less favourable than in the boom period not to say for migrant workers who nonetheless still flow to Thailand because the situation in their home country is far worse. This is especially the case for migrant workers coming from Burma viii A context of labour shortage is usually positive for workers because they are in a favourable situation to demand wage hikes. In Thailand, however, this was not so much the case due to the situation of labour repression. Since 1946, Thailand has experienced 18 coups d'états and promulgated 18 different constitutions, one of the highest records by world standards. Between these coups, parliamentarian regimes often maintained a limited democracy -meaning that labour was never given real political space whereby workers could voice their demands and strike bargains through trade unions and political parties (Brown, 2004) . During the industrialisation phase, two episodes have had long-lasting consequences. From late 1972 to late 1975, there was an explosion of labour activism and conflicts with a peak of 500 strikes, 180 000 workers involved in 1973 and 723 000 work days lost in 1975. This was accompanied by an expansion of labour organisation at the workplace. This labour unrest was linked with a broader civil movement for democracy that took place at the same moment but was also motivated by traditional labour issues: wage, working hours, working conditions and social security. The 6 October 1976 coup d'état put a brutal end to this turning point of Thai history and inflicted a major blow to trade unions. Strikes were outlawed until the end of 1977, trade unions meetings banned and numerous trade unions deregistered. The second episode occurred during the boom period. The coup d'état in 1991 after three years of a parliamentarian regime (1989) (1990) (1991) was followed by what Brown (op cit 2004, p 107) calls the "demolition of organised labour". So many restrictions were placed on labour rights that the small influence that trade unions had maintained at the national level declined severely. This does not mean that there were no more conflicts at the firm level, however. Through 1991 to 1995, the number of strikes, lock-outs and work days lost registered a small increase. Indeed, according to Baker and Phongpaichit (1998, op cit pp 141-142) firms concerned had to concede wage and bonus increases. But again, figure 5 shows that these cases were limited in number: the number of strikes remained under 40 strikes per year during the nineties, and the number of workers involved under 20 000, which is marginal. Even during the crisis (1997) (1998) , trade unions did not regain much influence. Although there were some resistance against dismissals in 1997, the number of strikes and workers involved plummeted in 1998. These few strikes focused on jobs and the legal obligations of employers and were long-lasted which explains that the number of work-days lost stayed high until 2000 by Thai standards. With the landslide electoral victories of Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister in 2001 and 2005, strikes and lock-outs became almost non-existent. These elections have marked Thai politics and its political economy profoundly x . His party was the first in Thailand history to make serious proposals of economic and social reforms geared toward low-income farmers and urban workers which won him strong support (Brown and Hewison, 2004 . For this reason his policies were cast as having a nationalist and populist character. Thaksin Shinawatra had met the trade unions during his first electoral campaign in 2001 and promised to satisfy some of their demands xi In this context of trade union weakness, it is not surprising that on the longterm and at national level, there has been no significant impact of labour conflicts on the evolution of real wages. Wage hikes are rather explained by the labour shortage and job hoping. When they are unsatisfied, Thai workers have no other solution than quitting their company and finding another job. Trade unions weakness also explains why they were unable to stop the decline in the labour income share in manufacturing after the crisis.
. In exchange, trade Unions largely supported him. Not only were these promises not fulfilled, but some of the trade unions were subsumed in the new political regime.
This post-crisis decline in the labour share helped to restore the profit rate in manufacturing. Figure 6 shows that the profit rate in manufacturing was initially very high with a peak at 56.4% in 1978. From this high level, the profit rate decreased regularly long before the crisis broke. Contrary to what has been previously observed at the economy level, in manufacturing the steady decline of capital productivity was not compensated by an equivalent increase in the capital share. Both factors combined to affect the profit rate negatively. In 1997, the profit rate had lost 27% percentage points up from its peak in 1978.
Figure 6 here.
After the crisis, the upward trend in capital productivity added to the increase of the capital share (at the expense of industrial workers) led the profit rate to around 53%, i.e. close to its 1978 peak level. Had the distribution of income been more equitable, thanks to a system of collective bargaining, the upward trend in capital productivity could have allowed, to a certain extent, an increase in workers' compensation. But that was not the choice that was made.
How can we explain the evolution of the capital productivity which appears to play a crucial role for the profit rate? Does the post-crisis increase in capital productivity means a gain in efficiency due to a modernisation of Thai manufacturing? Weisskopf (1979, p 342 ) provides a method for further decomposing the profit rate that adjusts the capital productivity for changes in capacity utilisation, an approach that has already been used by Glassman (2003, pp 89-92) for the period 1977-1996. We have updated his analysis with data for the period 1995-2006.
Weisskopf defines the profit rate as follows:
Where Z, is potential output or capacity of production. Thus, the profit rate is a function of the capital share ( ), the rate of capacity utilisation ( ), and the capacity/capital ratio ( ). The first of these reflects the distribution of income, the second the difficulty of firms in finding increasing adequate markets for output (or the realisation problem in Marxist terms), and the third changes in "pure" capital productivity due to increasing investment in labour-saving technology and progress in labour organisation xii . The combination of the last two determines the overall capital productivity .) Glassman's results (op cit p 93) show that during the first stage of the export-oriented boom (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) ) the capacity utilisation increased continuously which is quite expected, while the capacity/capital ratio decreased steadily until 1996. This tends to show that the boom was not sustained on "pure" capital productivity but rather on labour-intensive technology and classical Taylorist and Fordist labour organisation. After 1990, the capacity utilisation began to decreased too precipitating the decline in capital productivity and profit rate. Figure 7 shows what happened after the crisis. The capital/capacity ratio stabilised at a low level (about 20% below the 1996 level), while the ratio of capacity utilisation soared and in 2007 peaked at almost 90% above its 1996 level followed by the capital share which gained 20% relative to its pre-crisis level. The lesson is clear: The improvement in the profit rate is not based on a process of modernisation of manufacturing but rather on a redistribution of income in favour of capital and a transitional effect of improved capacity utilisation due to the elimination of surplus capacity during the crisis and a low investment rate thereafter.
The share of productivity gains
Because the evolution of the relative income share of capital and labour plays such a decisive role in maintaining the profit rate at a high level, it is necessary to understand how the productivity gains are shared between workers and employers. Table 1 presents the evolution of the labour income share and its determinants for the period 1970-2007 for the economy and in manufacturing xiii Table 1 here .
The sub-periods follow the business cycles experienced by the Thai economy since the 1970s (Mallikamas, Thaicharoen, Rodpengsangkaha, 2003) . Business cycles are defined as fluctuations in output around a trend that in the case of an emerging economy like Thailand has been always positive up to 1996. In this sense, the period of the crisis (1997-1999) is a special case due to both the severity of the crisis and its uniqueness until 2008. We have singled it out because the evolution of the labour income share during the crisis is not relevant xiv At the level of the total economy, one can see that before the boom period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , labour productivity outgrows real compensation during downturn and vice-versa, which is quite a normal pattern. Most surprising is that real compensation underperformed labour productivity during the boom years resulting in the most severe decrease of the labour share (-2.4%). After the crisis, the new upturn maintained the same unfavourable pattern and the labour share decreased on average by -1.7% per year. The average for the whole period confirms that clearly, growth did not benefit workers, the surplus created by productivity being funneled in favour of profit.
. The last column presents the long-term average of the period 1970-2007. The determinants of the labour share are the real average compensation per employee and labour productivity. If the real average compensation per worker increases less than labour productivity, then the labour income share decreases and vice-versa.
The manufacturing sector points to the opposite pattern. Up to the crisis of 1997-1999, real compensation growth outpaced labour productivity gains. The boom years were exceptionally favourable to workers due to labour shortage with real compensation increases of 10% per year supported by strong productivity gains (6.4%). During these years, the labour income share in manufacturing increased on average by 3.6% per year, which is quite exceptional. This is typical of a dual economy when the process of industrialisation speeds up growth and attracts workers from low-income jobs to higher-income jobs. But in the case of Thailand, and to the difference of South Korea and Taiwan, manufacturing did not become dominant in terms of employment. The result is that the favourable share of productivity gains experienced in manufacturing did not spread to the macro level where labour productivity gains outperformed real compensation.
A noteworthy fact is that, after the episode of the crisis, this duality somehow disappeared. Labour productivity was restored to a reasonably high level in manufacturing (with average rate of growth of 4.4% per year), but real compensation is now growing at a slower pace (1.7% per year). As a consequence, the labour income share is now decreasing as in the rest of the Thai economy. Manufacturing is no more an exception. The crisis of 1997-1999 has clearly introduced a new dynamic in the labour regime which has an impact on the dynamic of growth.
Section 2: The distribution of income and its impact on growth and competitiveness
This unfavourable distribution of revenues for both categories of workers after the crisis of 1997-99 contributed to a new pattern of growth. Figure 8 shows that since the second half of the sixties until the years 1979-86, private expenditure consumption was by far the main demand component with around two thirds of total demand. Government consumption expenditure was constant around 10% of total expenditures and so was gross fixed capital formation around 25%. What is remarkable is that the trade balance had a negative contribution to growth. In this sense, one can say that Thai growth at the time was led primarily by domestic demand, rather than net exports.
Figure 8 here
The situation started to change during the boom years . Private consumption expenditures declined 10 percentage points to the benefit of gross fixed investment which increased by 12 points in relation with the previous period . The contribution of trade balance was still negative (-4.4%). But the main change occurred with the crisis of 1997-99. Private consumption resisted during these years but investment lost almost 14 points and never recovered its pre-crisis level. Net exports have now a positive contribution to growth of 5.4% in the years 2000. This new positive contribution of trade can also be found in other countries such as China, India and Korea where growth is now much more dependent on net exports than it used to be in the previous decades (Felipe and Lim, 2005) . In the case of Thailand, this reduced contribution of domestic demand is coherent with the new distribution of income. Figure 9 compares the evolution of the share of private consumption in the GDP with the evolution of the labour income share s l . One can see that the decline of the labour share from 86% in 1960 down to 65% in 2007 has been followed by a decrease of private consumption from around 73% of GDP in 1960 to around 54% in 2007. It is much higher than the very low Chinese average at 37% or even the Malaysian average at 46% but below the Asian average at 58% and the OECD average at 61% xv Figure 9 here . To lift private consumption an increase in household's share of national income is necessary.
The fall of private consumption may explain the sluggishness of the rate of investment after the crisis. Indeed, a peculiar pattern of this new slow growth regime is that the relation between profit and investment has slackened in the post-crisis era as can be seen in figure 10.
Figure 10 here
During the years 1970-1996, the profit rate and investment (measured by the gross-fixed capital formation) went hand in hand. After the crisis, a gap between the profit rate and investment widened progressively. Profit returned to its historical peak reached during the boom, but investment did not fully recover. The main reason is the fall in investment in construction which stayed under 10% against 20% in the boom period. But even the investment in equipment remained subdued. It increased modestly from 12% to 15% of GDP in the years 2003-2005 but then stayed constant while profits were still improving. To summarize, profits have recovered because real compensation is lagging behind labour productivity but this has not induced a strong effort in investment.
This restriction of compensation has not been more useful to improve competitiveness. Theoretically, the distribution of income has direct consequences on competitiveness because it affects the unit labour cost which is one measure of cost competitiveness. The unit labour cost is defined as the ratio of the nominal compensation rate (baht per worker) to labour productivity, where the latter is defined as the volume of GDP per worker xvi . Therefore:
Where W n denotes the nominal compensation rate, VA n is the nominal value added or GDP at the aggregate level, P is the output deflator, L is the employment, Sl the labour income share. The equation shows that the unit labour cost can also be expressed as the labour income share multiplied by the GDP deflator. When one wants to assess competitiveness, the GDP deflator can be divided by a foreign exchange index "e", for instance the current exchange rate between the US dollar and the bath, or the effective exchange rate.
In this case, the depreciation of the Baht can more than offset the rise in the labour share "Sl" or of inflation "P" or a combination of both.
But to allow international comparisons in terms of absolute level of unit labour costs, the output, "VA n " needs to be converted to a common currency using purchasing power parity of the exchange rate (PPP) so that comparative output level are adjusted for differences in relative prices across countries.
As Van Ark et. al have convincingly argued, this means that the unit labour cost measure represents the current cost of labour per unit of output produced (Van Ark, Bart , Stuivenwold Edwin, and Ypma Gerard 2005) . Furthermore, equation 5 shows the existence of a direct link between the distribution of income and the competitiveness as expressed by ULC (Felipe, Sipin, 2004 op.cit, p 6-8) .
Figure 11 One can see that despite the decline of the labour income share from 86% in 1960 to 65% in 2007, the unit labour cost expressed in baht has increased steadily all along the period. The reason is the continuous increase of inflation (the GDP deflator), which more than compensated the decrease of the labour share. In terms of international competitiveness, it is worth observing that due to the fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate policy that prevailed from the fifties up to 1996 (Waiquamdee, Atchana, Disyatat Piti, and Pongsaparn Runchana 2005) xviii , the unit labour cost expressed in US $ followed closely the unit labour cost expressed in baht until the Asian crisis of 1997-The adoption of the "dirty float" regime after the crisis changed the situation dramatically. Following the sharp devaluation of the baht in 1997-1998, the unit labour cost in dollar terms remained at a low level in the following years reaching a post-crisis low in 2001 with a one third reduction compared to its 1996 level. This "cheap baht" period turned the rising "domestic" unit labour cost into a decreasing unit labour cost in dollar terms. The evolution of the real effective exchange rate was less favourable but still helped to lower the unit labour cost of Thailand compared to its main trading partners by around 20% in 2005 compared to its 1996 level. This favourable period finished relatively quickly. Since 2001, the baht is appreciating against the US $, with an acceleration since 2005. In 2007, the ULC expressed in US$ was over the peak reached in 1996 when the previous crisis broke. In real effective terms, the appreciation of the baht started only in 2005 but is following the same path. This means that the rising "domestic" labour cost is no more 1999. From 1960 up to 1984, the unit labour cost expressed in US dollar was even above the unit labour cost expressed in Thai baht which proves that the dollar peg was detrimental to export competitiveness. This was not a concern during most of the period because Thailand was pursuing an import-substitution policy at the time and a stable currency was favourable to the import of capital goods. After the devaluation of the baht during the years 1981-84, the ULC expressed in baht and in dollar moved closely upward. As a consequence, the competitiveness shrunk by 43% from 1985 to 1996. This contributed strongly to the deficit of the current account that eventually led to the massive outflows during the crisis. One can see that in terms of real effective exchange rate, the unit labour cost was close to one from 1990 to 1996. This means that the loss of competitiveness was not generalised to all Thailand's trading partners but rather was focused on the USA in particular.
compensated by a depreciation of the Baht, but quite to the contrary the two factors are adding together to erode Thailand's competitiveness. This is putting Thai exporters under stress because the investment failure makes it difficult to increase productivity as a way to improve unit labour cost. As a consequence, the downward pressure on workers' compensation will probably continue and be stronger in the future. This is confirmed by an analysis of the relative level of the unit labour cost using equation (5) that adjust the labour share "Sl" by a pure price effect "PPP/e" expressed in US$ (see figure 12) . One can see that the unit labour cost was fluctuating around 50% of the US level between 1975 and 1980. It decreased regularly below 40% in the years [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . During the years 1980-1985, the decrease is explained by the price effect. The ratio of the PPP exchange rate to the current exchange rate fell from 0.63 in 1980 to 0.45 in 1985 thanks to a 32% devaluation of the baht during this period. But after 1985, the unit labour cost stayed below 40% of the US level thanks to a decrease of the labour share to 62% in 1996 of GDP up from 78% in 1985. Without the loss of 16 percentage point of GDP of the labour share, the unit labour cost would have followed the same trend as the price effect which appreciated sharply due to the peg to the dollar. After the brutal depreciation of the Baht due to the Asian crisis, the unit labour cost stayed at an historical low of 28% of the US level. The appreciation of the baht due to the surplus of the current account combined to massive inflows of capital during this last period explains that the price effect has offset by large the decrease of the labour share to 65% in 2007 down from 75% in 1999.
Using again equation (5), a simple calculation show that, (other things being equal), if the labour share had stayed at its 1996 low level, i.e. 62%, the ULC would have nonetheless followed the same upward pattern. It would have reached 30.6% in 2008 of the US level instead of the 32.8% it reached effectively that year. If we now hypothesize that the unit labour cost stays at its 2001 level, i.e. 26% of the US level, how much the labour share has to fall to offset the appreciation of the price effect "PPP/e" witnessed during the years 2002-2008? Figure 13 shows that the labour share should fall to 52.6% of GDP, which would be an unprecedented low level with strong negative impact on the rate of growth.
Figure 13 here
Conclusion
These simple calculations reveal that although there is a link between the distribution of income and competiveness measured by the unit labour cost, this link is in fact weak. The fluctuations of the exchange rate are in practice of a much higher magnitude than fluctuations of the labour share which move significantly on the medium and long-term. This means that there is no point in repressing income, so that it increases less than productivity, to improve competitiveness. Quite to the contrary, the international crisis that broke in 2008 bring to the fore the necessity to rebalance the growth of Asian countries in favour of the domestic market. And as we have seen previously, an increase of households' consumption can only be achieved if their income regains the loss suffered these last decades and this can be done without a major impact on cost competitiveness. This lesson is probably true for other Asian countries and especially China where households' consumption with 35% of GDP in 2008 is probably the lowest recorded at world level. The export-led growth model has reached its limit and must be substituted by a more domestic-demand growth model.
Statistical appendix
Data from the national accounts comes from the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) of Thailand. Three data series (1960-1975), (1970-1990) and (1980-2008) have been combined and matched to constitute a single series in constant 1988 bath. We have used the annual growth of the series in current baht to backward look the previous annual value of the GDP. We then divided the new unified series by the GDP deflator to convert the current data in constant 1988 baht. The same method was applied for the compensation of employees and the income of unincorporated enterprises. The labour income share is calculated as a share of GDP at factor cost.
Data regarding employment and the labour force comes from the National Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand. During the first years, the only available data was for the first and third quarter. The first quarter coincides with the non-agricultural season and the third with the agricultural season when numerous urban workers went back to the countryside to help for the rice harvest. In order to have the most coherent data series we have decided to retain the third quarter only from 1969 to 2008. This underestimates a bit the true number of industrial and services workers and thus the number of wages workers. But it avoids seasonal fluctuations and breaks in the series. Since the nineties the seasonal migration for the harvest has been much less important than it used to be and the bias is negligible. For the years 1960-1968, total employment and the number of wage and non-wage workers has been estimated from the data series of the labour force. We have applied the employment rate of 1969 to the labour force of the years 1960-1968 to estimate the total employment and then estimated the number of wage and non-wage workers by applying their relative share of 1969 to the total employment of the previous years.
Data regarding the capital stock comes from NESDB. We have used the net capital stock.
Data regarding the current exchange rate and effective exchange rate comes from the Bank of Thailand. Data on the purchasing power parity exchange rate comes from the 2005 International Comparison Program of the World Bank. 
Total Economy
Average rate of growth, % 1970-1975 1976-1978 1979-1986 1987-1996 1997-1999 2000-2007 1970-2007 % 1971-1975 1976-1978 1979-1986 1987-1996 1997-1999 2000-2007 1971-2007 iii) The informal economy encompasses all economic activities that contribute to the officially calculated gross national product but are currently unregistered. According to a survey of the National Statistical Office of Thailand, the informal employment amounted to 63% of total employment in 2007. Agriculture accounted for 60% of informal employment, wholesale and retail trade for 16%, hotels and restaurants 7%, manufacturing 5%, construction 4% and others 8%. iv) This consists in two adjustments. Adjustment 1 is calculated as the sum of the shares in GDP of employees plus the share of OSPUE to one, minus the share in GDP of indirect taxes and subsidies and provision for consumption of fixed capital. This adjustment treats all OPSUE as labour income, so it gives an overestimated labour income share. In the case of Thailand, it leads to a labour share that declines from 0. vi It is actually calculated as 1 minus the labour share.
vii This point is strongly established in development economics (see Johnston, 1970 , Badhuri, 2003 , Holz, 2008 but recently contested by Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003) who argue that the convergence in the degree of industrialization between developing and developed countries has not been associated with a convergence of the level of per capita income. Their demonstration is criticised by Amsden, (2003) who claims that their empirical evidence is flawed and that their theory, a revival of the dependency theory, has been long ago contradicted by the successful development of South Korea, Singapore Hong Kong and Taiwan and now the rise of China, Brazil and India. For Firebaugh (2004) the problem lies in the misinterpretation of their central model. We are aware of this debate but our point is not the question of the convergence of income level but the impact of industrialization on productivity, income and development.
viii East Asia is one of the most world's active and regionally based migrant systems. Thailand attracts workers from neighbour countries such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, because jobs are numerous for unskilled and semiskilled workers in sectors like construction, fishery and plantations and because Thai wages are higher. See for instance Bhatnagar and Manning (2005) , Jones and Finlay (1998) . In the case of Burma, refugees fleeing human rights abuses and military offensives by the military junta provide a continuous flow of workers that Thai firms recruit for dangerous, difficult and dirty jobs that Thai workers do not want any longer to occupy, at least in times of growth. On this point see Hyndman (2001) . ix A partial view only: Strikes and lock-outs are usually underreported to authorities who themselves do not like to present an image of high conflictuality to foreign investors. More, strikes and lock-outs are the most extreme forms of labour disputes. At the first stage, trade unions can petitioned the authorities or sue the employer. Brown and Hewison (2005, p 366 ) provide evidence for the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] showing that "courts were choked with thousands of unresolved cases". x Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted by a coup d'état in 2006. xi Brown and Hewisson (2005, p 363-364) give a detail account of these discussions. An agreement was drafted that stipulates among other things that Thailand would sign the ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining (conventions 87 and 98). Thailand has still not signed these conventions. xii The term "capital productivity" is used by neither by Weisskopf (1979) nor by Glassman (2003) because in Marxist theory, productivity refers to labour. But is nothing else than the capacity of production (Z) determined by a certain amount and a certain type of capital (K). An increase in means that the same amount of capital (K) is able to produce more, which is only possible if there are technical or organisational innovations. xiii The data series in manufacturing for GDP, compensation and employment starts in 1970 only.
xiv During periods of crisis, lots of firms go bankrupt or struggle for survival. As a consequence, the capital share falls and the labour share increases. These changes are exceptional and do not reflect a structural change in capital and labour income share. It is better not to take them in consideration. xv Source: author's calculations with United Nations Statistical Division data. xvi « A specific characteristic of unit labour cost measure is that the numerator, which reflects the labour cost component of the equation, is typically expressed in nominal terms, whereas the denominator, which is productivity, is measured in real or volume terms" (Ark Van, Monnikhof, 2000) . This apparent contrast can be understood when interpreting the unit labour cost measure as an indicator of cost competitiveness. It then adequately represents the current cost of labour (the numerator) per "quantity unit" of output produced (the denominator) which can only be proxied at the aggregate level by deflated value added. xvii) Figure 10 is based on the following hypotheses: because the data was not yet published, the income labour share for 2005, 70%, was supposed constant for 2006 and 2007, which is reasonable because income do not fluctuate a lot from year to year. For 2007, the foreign exchange rates used cover the first semester only. xviii Thailand has followed a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate policy from 1963 until 1997. There was a fixed exchange rate with the US $ at around 20 baht per dollar up to 1978, then a basket currency peg in which the dollar played a major role up 30 June of 1997 when the crisis forced the Bank of Thailand to abandon the peg. The baht has floated since then with discretionary interventions of the Bank of Thailand (see Waiquamdee et. Ali 2005) .
